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Chapter 5

Critique, construction, and
confluence
Journeying with John Shotter
Kenneth J. Gergen

I count my relationship with John Shotter – as a friend and dialogic companion
– as one of the greatest fortunes of my career. The scholarly dialogues in
which we have engaged are echoed – directly or indirectly – in almost all my
writings of the past forty years. To be sure, we have not always agreed; but
these tensions were ever the catalysts for lively conversation. In what follows I
wish to touch on some of the significant chapters in our journeying together.
My hope is to accomplish several goals at once. At the outset, this may enable
the reader to appreciate the profundity of Shotter’s work, and the ways it has
entered into the larger intellectual movements of the times. At the same time,
I wish to tell a more personal story, one that may furnish some insight into
our own particular dialogues, the affinities, and the deviations. Finally, the
attempt is to instantiate the relational conceptions that have so pervaded the
dialogues in which we have engaged. In this register, this is not a story about
John, or about me, but a relationship.

A comrade in critique
Both Shotter and I were trained as experimental psychologists. As our careers
got under way, however, both of us also found ourselves ‘hearing voices’.
These were voices of doubt in the experimental study of human behaviour
and its promises for humankind. They were voices from philosophy,
literature, the theatre, the arts and others that simply emerged in the course
of living engaged and complex lives with others. For me, the exit from the
mainstream was first crystallised in 1972, and the publication of my paper,
‘Social psychology as history’ in the flagship Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology. I proposed in this paper that experiments in social psychology
were not tapping universal processes, but rather, historically situated actions.
What is more, as the discipline educated the public regarding its insights, this
education could alter the very patterns under study. Thus, social psychology
did not accumulate knowledge, because patterns of human action were
always in motion. And the science indeed contributed to these changes.
The paper created enormous controversy at the time, contributing to what
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was called ‘the crisis in social psychology’. The discipline closed ranks, and
at a later meeting of the elite organisation, the Society for Experimental
Social Psychology, it was simply declared that the crisis was over. No more
discussion. I was now on the outside, but not looking in.
Rather, my intellectual interests expanded, and with this expansion I
began to locate other dissident voices – colleagues in arms. Shotter’s 1975
book, Images of Man in Psychological Research, was akin to the discovery
of gold. Here was another psychologist who was willing to risk academic
suicide by raising significant questions about his discipline. Our quarries
were quite different. Shotter was primarily concerned with what he saw
as a misleading if not injurious image of man created by the ‘mechanisticbehaviouristic’ approach to psychological study. However, contained within
his analysis were certain assumptions that were very much part of my own
critique. For one, he viewed the person primarily as a cultural actor, moving
within a domain of shared ideas and values. As he wrote, psychologists must
treat people ‘in terms of their knowledge of their position in a culture; that is,
in terms of a knowledge that their actions play in relation to the part played
by other people’s actions in maintaining or progressing the culture’ (1975,
14). Without such an assumption, indeed, my own critique would not make
sense. Further, present in his work were formulations that were resonant with
my concern with what I called enlightenment effects, that is, the impact on
culture resulting from the knowledge dispensed by the discipline. As Shotter
put it, ‘all the different theories of . . . human nature that people produce can
be seen as emerging from, and returning to modify, different forms of human
action’ (1975, 128). Bravo!
It also became clear to me that Shotter was not writing in a vacuum. His
work was in dialogue with other British scholars, prominent among them the
Oxford philosopher Rom Harré. In the summer of 1979, Mary and I decided
to spend time in Oxford with Rom and a coterie of psychologists who were
also seeking alternatives to mainstream experimentation. This also provided
the opportunity to travel down to Cardiff, Wales, to attend a conference on
‘Models of Man’. We were especially keen to hear a presentation by Shotter.
John’s offering at the conference was impressive: highly sophisticated,
articulate and, even if elliptical, rich in imagery and implication. We listened
with rapt attention. The floor was then opened to discussion. Our exposure
to academic critique in the US had not prepared us for what was to follow.
In the US, criticism is typically muted and respectful. The commentators in
this context were neither. Nor did their remarks advance our understanding.
Simply describing an argument as ‘rubbish’ does not constitute a counterargument; it rather speaks to the incapacity of the commentator to deal with
what’s been heard. In any case, as the evening ended, Mary and I sought
out John’s company. We were not only impressed with the presentation, but
felt he might benefit from a little support. That evening together was the
beginning of a lifelong friendship.
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In the years immediately following, there were multiple visits, letters and
phone calls in which we touched on many issues. The circle of ‘renegades’
was also expanding at a rapid clip. In the UK, discussions with Rom Harré
were enriched by the presence of Michael Billig, Jonathan Potter, Celia
Kitzinger, Margaret Wetherall, Mary Douglas, and Ian Parker among others.
In Norway there was Ragnar Rommetweit and Jan Smedslund; in Spain the
work of Tomas Ibanez and his colleagues; in France Erika Apfelbaum and at
least tangentially, Serge Moscovici; in Canada Fran Cherry, Ian Lubeck and
Franz Samuelson; and in the US, Jill Morawski, Keith Davis and Ed Sampson,
among others. The times were bristling with new and challenging ideas.
Our relations with these individuals further fanned the flames of our
dialogic seminars. To sense the intensity, when I was taking a sabbatical at
Heidelberg University, John drove down for a visit. In the hills by the Neckar
River, there is a wondrous path, the Philosophenweg, from which one can view
the entire Neckar valley, the river, the town and the medieval castle. The
views are breath-taking. As John and I strolled on the Weg, we were deep in
conversation – exploring the many intellectual pathways now open to us. At
the summit of the walk, however, I realised that John had never actually taken
in the view! Now we made it a point to stop all conversation, and simply drink
in the sight before us. But even here, I could sense John’s eagerness to return
to the pathways of the spirit. The view was static, the ideas so very much alive.

Figure 5.1 Reflections on the existing profession bred intense critique.
One response was bravado! (Ken Gergen (left) and John Shotter (right))
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In these years with John, I also learned much that went beyond the
conceptual worlds we explored. There was first an appreciation of John’s
particular orientation towards scholarship, one I came to view as an aesthetic
craftsmanship. My own predilection was towards patterns. I scanned
intellectual territories, deliberating on the emerging patterns, the disjunctions
and the implications. I did not so much attempt to master the intricacies of
an author’s writings as to seek out the pieces that would bring about the
completion of a larger puzzle. One might say that my orientation to the
scholars was one of appropriation. John’s orientation, in contrast, was one
of intimate absorption. I was awed by the way in which John would carefully
pore over the lines of a text, pausing to ponder the phrases. To thumb through
a book John was reading was to realise that he was not simply reading, but
having an intense dialogue. There were incessant underlines, sometimes in
different colours, accompanied by marginal comments. Pages often showed
signs of wear, suggesting they had been revisited on numerous occasions. And
very often, John would recite the lines. These were not mere recitations; the
lines were delivered with the full rhetorical power of a well acted Hamlet or
Lear. The lines were being tasted, as if seated at the table of a famous chef.
There were also lessons in writing. When I began writing my PhD
dissertation I met with the strong criticism of my doctor father, Edward E.
Jones. As he rightly put it, I was using as my model a rhetorical form that
echoed that of nineteenth-century philosophy. Sentences were long, complex
and highly abstract. As Jones admonished, ‘If you really have anything to
say, make it clear to me.’ So, much of my writing up to my acquaintance
with Shotter had become scientised – concise, precise and to the point. In
this context, I must admit that I was not initially drawn to John’s form of
writing. For me there was too much ambiguity. I was sometimes puzzled
by his formulations, feeling that I was wandering through a cloudy sky with
hope that a clearing would soon bring the sunlight of understanding. Some
of my scholarly companions experienced similar difficulties, and this was
especially disappointing. I so wanted Shotter’s work to make a difference
to them. Slowly, however, I began to develop a taste for Shotter’s form of
exposition. What had been opacity became a sense of mystery; where there
were unsolved puzzles I realised I was being pushed as reader to join in the
search for solutions. His writing challenged me to think along with him, and
to cherish the newly emerging insights. There was also a certain elegance
about John’s writing, and always a subtle passion woven into the fibres. In
short, there were ways in which Shotter’s writing was auratic, possessing an
ambience of significant mystery. This has meant a steadily expanding sea of
appreciative readers of John’s works. I now count myself among them, even
while such skills ever elude me.
There is a third Shotterian lesson that launched for me a new way to
approach my own theoretical investigations. John and I often talked about the
generation of ideas, and how as a theoretician one could or should proceed.
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So much theoretical writing seemed timid and inconsequential; often one’s
case would be built around the work of an emulated theorist of the past, as
if the name of the theorist would function as a shield against critique. Then,
subtly the writer’s own ideas would be secreted into the margins, barely
recognisable as challenges to the status quo. There was also the question of
whether a theorist must possess a logical structure prior to setting words on
paper. Must the theory be clear and coherent to the author before its public
articulation? On the contrary, argued John. As he described his approach to
writing, one begins with a destination, that is, something important that one
wishes to convey – a message, as it were. Then, one simply sets out to reach
this destination through writing. As he reasoned, the essential logics will
emerge along the way, as one draws resources from multiple sites, wrestles
with critiques and imagines possible routes to the destination. How useful
this lesson has been, and how awed I have been to find that as I write, the
voices of my colleagues – both in the flesh and in the surrounding bookcases
– speak me forward.

The constructionist years: Wittgenstein joins the
conversation
The intellectual atmosphere of these years was increasingly heated. Everywhere
there were challenges to long-standing assumptions and practices. The
critical movement was in full swing, with Marxists now joined by feminists,
gay and lesbian factions, African American and environmentalist groups,
among many others. The literary world was aflame with post-structuralist
and deconstructionist challenges to traditional views of textual meaning.
Hermeneutic theory was revitalised, as the unsolved problem of interpretation
re-emerged from its historical encasement. In philosophy the demise of
foundationalist ambitions was clearly at hand, and the philosophy of science
was being replaced by a social account of science. These were exciting times in
the world of scholarship. Disciplinary boundaries were broken, new freedoms
were exercised, and new worlds of possibility were opened. There are many
labels for this period of ferment: postmodernism, post-foundationalism, and
post-structuralism the most visible. And all of these discussions fed directly
into our dialogues.
However, if there were one theorist from whom both John and I drew
major sustenance, it was Ludwig Wittgenstein. We were entranced by his
later writing, and would often favour each other with quotes drawn from
Philosophical Investigations, the Blue and Brown Books, and the Remarks on
the Philosophy of Psychology. John ultimately went on to collect his writings on
Wittgenstein, and these were made available online by the Taos Institute in
2011.1 More will be said about this later. However, fortified by our discussions
of Wittgenstein, along with a wide range of related writings, we began to
move toward several major and quite revolutionary (for the time) conclusions:
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• Our language about the world is not derived from the way things
are, but has its origins in relationships among people. Thus, scientific
accounts of the world are not pictures or maps of the world as it is, but
the ‘ways of talk’ developed by various scientific enclaves. In effect,
this meant replacing various forms of realism and essentialism with a
constructionist orientation to all truth claims.
• Neither philosophy nor science should be viewed as sources of
fundamental truth, but as conversations within their respective
traditions. Attempts to freeze these insights into universal, transhistorical
structures are misdirected if not crippling.
• The field of psychology is flawed in its attempts to establish laws of
psychological functioning. The language of mental life does not
function to describe mental states, but functions pragmatically within
relationships.
As we also found, we were not alone in moving towards such conclusions.
In 1983 a conference was thus organised at Swarthmore College on ‘The social
construction of the person’. Participants in the conference were drawn from
fields of psychology, philosophy, sociology, communication, anthropology
and family therapy. In the 1985 publication of The Social Construction of
the Person,2 John’s contribution both echoed and extended the dialogues in
which we had been engaged. The concern with language was expressed in
the first lines of his contribution, ‘Rather than the study of behaviour itself,
I am concerned here with the study of how we talk about ourselves and our
behaviour’ (p. 167). The implications of this stance for the social construction
of science were thus quite clear, ‘whenever we speak of atoms, and molecules,
and the laws of nature, and so on, we are speaking of what we mean by the
expressions atom, molecules, and the laws of nature; they are all expressions
associated with a particular way of seeing the world and of manipulating it
by the means it provides’ (p. 175). When this view is applied to the social
sciences, and to psychology in particular, there are critical questions to be
raised, for ‘“the self” is, as I have suggested, a scientific concept devised for
scientific purposes: purposes to do with attempts to gain practical mastery’
(p. 181). Of major importance for John, scientific accounts stand outside
the activities they attempt to understand, and for genuine understanding to
occur, it must take place from the inside. One might say that to understand
was to dwell within the practices of relationships themselves.
At that point in time, the London publishing company Sage boasted a staff
of editors in the social sciences who were very much part of the constructionist
dialogues. Discussions with the editors thus yielded an opportunity for John
and me to launch a book series, Inquiries in Social Construction. In our
view, the dialogues that were now sweeping around us were in danger of
fragmentation, with the result that what could be a major and much needed
shift in the conduct of social science would dissipate into a set of local turf
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wars. Needed was a vehicle that would not only demonstrate a common
consciousness of constructionist ideas, but would invite dialogue across
disciplines. Thus, as we wrote on the jacket copy, the series was ‘designed to
facilitate, across disciplines and national boundaries, an emergent dialogue
within the social sciences which many believe presages a major shift in the
western intellectual tradition’. The series went on to generate some nineteen
volumes. A sense of the intellectual ferment of the times is revealed by
scanning the titles:
Kitzinger, C. (1987) The Social Construction of Lesbianism.
Shotter, J., and Gergen, K. J. (eds) (1989). Texts of Identity.
Simons, H. (1989) Rhetoric in the Human Sciences.
Middleton, D., and Edwards, D. (eds) (1990). Collective Remembering.
Semin, G.R., and Gergen, K.J. (eds) (1990). Everyday Understanding:
Social and Scientific Implications.
Nencel, L., and Pels, P. (eds) (1991). Constructing Knowledge: Authority
and Critique in Social Science.
Kvale, S. (ed.) (1992) Psychology and Postmodernism.
McNamee, S., and Gergen, K.J. (eds) (1992). Therapy as Social
Construction.
Steier, F. (ed.) (1991). Research and Reflexivity.
Shotter, J. (1993). Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through
Language.
Radtke, H.L., and Stam, H.J. (eds) (1994). Power/Gender: Social Relations
in Theory and Practice.
Sarbin, T.R., and Kitsuse, J.I. (eds) (1994). Constructing the Social.
Simons, H.W., and Billig, M. (1994). After Postmodernism: Reconstructing
Ideology Critique.
Bakhurst, D., and Sypnowich, C. (eds) (1995). The Social Self.
Riikonen, E., and Smith, G.M. (1997). Re-imagining Therapy: Living
Conversations and Relational Knowing.
Bayer, B.M., and Shotter, J. (eds) (1998). Reconstructing the Psychological
Subject: Bodies, Practices and Technologies.
Parker, I. (ed.) (1998). Social Constructionism, Discourse and Realism.
Hepworth, J. (1999). The Social Construction of Anorexia Nervosa.
Fee, D. (ed.) (2000). Pathology and the Postmodern: Mental Illness as
Discourse and Experience.
We terminated the series in 2000, not for the lack of good material, but
because there was no longer a major need. Constructionist ideas, in one
form or another, were now everywhere in motion. In disciplines such as
anthropology, cultural studies, communication and micro-sociology, such
ideas were indeed receding into the common-sense background from which
one did one’s work.

Critique, construction, and confluence

81

As a professional psychologist, one of the most important outcomes of
the constructionist dialogues for me was the realisation that psychological
discourse was itself a construction. Thus, the vast discourse of the mind –
pivotal to our ways of life in the West – was ontologically optional. I saw John
as a close companion in exploring the implications of this realisation. In my
view, one of the most important aspects of John’s particular contribution to
the series, Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language, was
his implicit critique of dualism. As John reasoned, mental talk should not be
viewed as representational, that is, depicting a uniquely mental world. Rather,
such talk was used by people in the conduct of their everyday lives. We use
such talk as a means of relating. For both of us, this idea fundamentally
changed the way in which we understood the discipline of psychological
science. It was pointless to engage in the ‘study of the mind’ as if it were
some sort of object to be observed or interrogated. As John wrote, ‘Why do
we seem so fixated, so to speak, upon the idea that there must be, somewhere
in everyone, a “mind”’ (p. 24). And, echoing our readings in Wittgenstein,
‘For “mind”, as such, ceases to be something to be explained, and becomes
instead a rhetorical device, something we talk of at various different times
for various different purposes’ (p. 29). To these rhetorical devices for
constructing and reconstructing the self, John had devoted an entire volume,
Social Accountability and Selfhood, in the preceding year.
These years rippled with excitement, new insights abounded and our
dialogues left us both inspired and newly charged. To provide a flavor of
those times, I share a portion of a small thank-you note that John left with
Mary and me after a visit to our home.
Dearest Ken and Mary,
Another magic time. What happens to make them so? Some kind of
resonating that produces total enlivenment. The fountainhead is with
you, and I just immerse myself in the flow and go . . . you seem to have
some key to me that others don’t use.
Of course, John was simply being gracious to attribute to us the source of
the enlivenment. We were all aware that the outcome was relational, and this
consciousness made its way increasingly into our writings. John led the way.

Inspirations and contentions
John’s writings have always been – and continue to be – a source of lively
inspiration. But one of John’s concepts has had a profound effect on my
intellectual trajectory. This was the concept of joint action. The term had
been coined by Herbert Blumer (1986) in 1969, and referred to the way
in which the many diverse acts of individuals contribute to the pattern of
society as a whole. Each individual action might be carried out for its own
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purposes, but social patterns were effectively the result of joint action. John’s
first use of the phrase was in 1980, in an essay titled ‘Action, joint action
and intentionality’. Although carrying traces of Blumer, John’s emphasis was
micro-social. As he emphasised, people together create a shared world – their
reality – but this reality cannot be traced back to the desires or wishes of the
participating individuals. Joint action thus stood as dramatic alternative to the
more traditional idea of inter-action, in which self-contained individuals act
upon each other in cause and effect sequences. And too, the concept added
a new dimension to Wittgenstein’s account of language games. Meaning did
not derive from individual minds, but from the coordinated actions of those
who are playing. For me this was a pivotal turning point in my intellectual
life. It sparked a decades-long deliberation on how to conceptualise social
process in a way that did not depend on distinct units as its starting place.
For John and I together, it led to our single jointly written article, ‘Social
construction: knowledge, self, others, and continuing the conversation’
(Shotter and Gergen, 1994). As I saw it, John never attempted to fix the
meaning of the concept of joint action; its polysemous character was its very
strength. Thus, in our article together, John was kind enough to allow me to
elaborate the concept in a way that set the stage for years of later work. I will
say more about this shortly.
Yet, in spite of this affinity toward a relational reconstruction of the person,
there was what I felt to be a new turn in John’s work, one that was to place
an intellectual wedge between us for some years. Possibly for John this was
not a new turn, as the grounds could be located in his early work, Images of
Man in Psychological Research. As mentioned earlier, there he had criticised
scientific depictions of human action for their ‘view from the outside’. As he
saw it, psychologists used these depictions for purposes of mastery over the
‘objects’ of their gaze. As he advanced, genuine understanding takes place
within the relational process itself. Thus, by the early 1990s, John was writing
about a knowing of the third kind, neither a ‘knowing that’ something is the
case, nor a personal ‘knowing how’, but a knowing from within the situation.
Although I saw this as a conceptual tour de force, it was an intellectual move
of precarious potential. It seemed to me that to account for such a ‘knowing
within’ would leave the theorist with two primary options, both of which
were freighted with difficulties. On the one hand he could try to construct an
entirely new vocabulary of relational process, that is, a vocabulary in which
there were no individual actors, per se, but a continuous stream of jointactivity. But this choice would essentially recapitulate the problem of the
outsider, articulating a ‘knowing that’ from a third-person perspective. Like
the traditional psychologist, he would be relying on an alien language to
‘depict’ the nature of relations. On the other hand, he could attempt to
reveal a knowing with from the inside, from the perspective of those engaged
in joint activity. However, in this case he would run the risk of reverting to
the very kind of individualist-atomistic tradition the account was designed to
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replace – singular individuals, living within their own experience. As I saw it,
John was prone to take this risk.
It was thus that John began to develop a full range of highly innovative
concepts. He wrote much, for example, about the ‘rhetorically responsive’
individual, one who responds sensitively to the actions of others. This view was
amplified by Katz and Shotter (1996) in their writing about the importance
in the diagnostic interview of closely attending to the ‘patient’s voice’, and
later their focus on those ‘striking moments’ in a conversation in which one
gains the kind of insight that may significantly alter the dialogic trajectory
(Katz and Shotter, 2004). Slowly I felt, there was movement away from the
relational process in itself, and a reverting to two fundamentally separate
individuals in interaction. Shotter’s later writings on ‘withness thinking’ had
this same feel. As he wrote,
Withness-thinking and acting is a form of reflective interaction that involves
coming into contact with an other’s living being, with their utterances,
their bodily expressions, their words, their ‘works’. It gives rise not to a
‘seeing’ for what is ‘sensed’ is invisible; nor to an interpretation, for our
responses occur spontaneously and directly in our living encounters with
an other’s expressions . . .
(2010, 179)
Even a touch of introspection entered the scene, as John (2008) wrote
about ‘identifying the nature of felt understandings’ (p. 84). And the concept
of joint action, my early love, became something entirely different in a 2008
work, ‘Joint action comes into being when, in their meetings with each other,
people’s activities become spontaneously and responsively intertwined or
entangled’. As result of their ‘mutual influence’, as he put it, they ‘will have
come to embody different ways of perceiving, thinking, talking, acting, and
valuing’ (p. 36). To be sure, these were eminently sensible innovations – but
for me, they sustained the tradition from which we had both been liberated.
There was a second issue that invited an intellectual distance, and in
retrospect, I now see it in terms of an ambiguity that has always hovered over the
constructionist realm. For me, the constructionist turn was tied closely to the
more general critique of foundational philosophy of science, and specifically to
its inimical consequences for inquiry in psychology and related sciences. Thus,
I had been drawn to Shotter’s Images of Man because of its synchrony with the
more general critical movement in the social sciences, and its challenge to the
foundationalist claims to value-free knowledge. Our continuously engaging
discussions of Wittgenstein were, for me, important in terms of the insights
they provided into the linguistic production of scientific knowledge and its
implications for the limits of scientific realities. And, for me, both these points
of affinity with John were linked to the emergence of deconstruction and
reader response theory in literary circles, and most importantly to the phalanx
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of writings in the history of science, the sociology of knowledge, and the social
studies of science. All pointed to an alternative to empiricist foundationalism,
namely a social constructionist metatheory of science.
What I failed to realise at the time was that John’s aims had become quite
different from mine. Where I was struggling with a successor project to
empiricism, John was working steadfastly on a replacement to the mechanistic
vision of man that had been spawned by the empiricist orientation to
knowledge. He wished to ‘situate social constructionist studies not only in a
conversational background or context, but also in the moment to moment
meeting between two or more persons’ (1993, 31). I was primarily concerned
with meta-theory, a way of understanding all knowledge claims, while John
was attempting to generate a particular kind of knowledge claim. Now, from
the meta-theoretical standpoint, there is no vision of human nature that is
demanded by ‘the way things are’. All claims of this sort are constructions,
and the primary questions concern the cultural consequences of adopting
one construction as opposed to another. Thus, it seemed premature to rush
into an account of human action that reified the constructionist metatheory
– at least without acknowledging its constructed character.
In any case, in several of his writings John waxed critical of the
constructionist movement. For one, it was too heavily linguistic. He found
its excessive focus on language (e.g. narrative, metaphor, rhetoric) blinded us
to the fully embodied character of human existence (see e.g. Shotter, 2008,
2010). For me, the critique was off the mark, and this was primarily because
he seemed to be taking aim at the meta-theory as if it were an attempt to
construct the nature of social life. At the meta-theoretical level, the focus
on language was pivotal in understanding the structure of knowledge claims
in their historical and cultural location. Such a meta-theory did not require
any particular concept of the person or social life. All are constructions
with varied cultural implications. This included theories that borrowed
from the meta-theory (i.e. realities are constructed in relations). However,
to demand of the meta-theory a disquisition on embodiment was both
unnecessary and problematic. At the meta-theoretical level, it was important
to remain conceptually lean. That is, a constructionist meta-theory is itself
a construction. To load it with embodied actors would suggest that it was a
candidate for truth. And to add bodies would open the way to including all
sorts of other realities, including power, social structure, the environment
and of course, thinking, feeling and perceiving. At this point, what is
premised as an orientation, profound in its potential, lapses into yet another
competitor for the final truth about knowledge.

Relational wisdom: from knowledge to practice
In 2009 I completed what for me was an important work, Relational Being:
Beyond Self and Community. In the Prologue of that book I wrote that there
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was not a single word in the volume that had not in some way been touched by
my relationship with John. Later, John conveyed to me how much he liked the
book. One very important conclusion that can be drawn from our journey is
that differences in the position one takes on any issue should not undermine the
relationship with those who differ. For one, emerging from our constructionist
background, there is no ultimate justification for any particular construction
of the real and the good. There was no need to fight about the true nature
of experience, of thought, embodiment theory, and so on. Because all we
could do is to construct the meanings of these words and how they might be
embedded in action. And even if one of us questioned the logical and ideological
implications of a given formulation, such questioning could in no way be lethal.
Constructionism invites a certain humility when it comes to offering opinions
on how things actually are or should be. Nor, do such theoretical propositions
have any necessary implications for action. The Christian Bible and the Koran
have both been interpreted in ways both nurturing and annihilating. It is only
when propositions become attached to declarations of TRUE and RIGHT that
bags are needed for bodies. And finally, if all meaning issues from relational
process, then it is this process we should treasure and sustain.
It is within this context that one may appreciate why the intellectual
differences sometimes separating John and I have never affected the
nourishing quality of our relationship. Indeed, there is a range of affinities to
which our writings have more recently led us. I shall complete this offering

Figure 5.2 Copenhagen, 2014: sustaining the synergy
(Ken Gergen (left) and John Shotter (right))
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with a discussion of only one of these: Perhaps ironically, while both of us have
spent a substantial parts of our career engaged in theoretical and philosophical
exploration, this engagement has ultimately given way to a profound concern
with relational practices. As I pointed out earlier, John had been critical of the
‘way of theory’, that is, the traditional attempt to establish rational orders of
understanding. However, I trace the origin of our joint-concern with practices
to an earlier sharing, namely the immersion in Wittgenstein’s writings. Both
of us had drawn great nourishment from Wittgenstein’s (1952) view of word
meaning as deriving from its use in social interchange, and the location of
such interchange in broader forms of life. Initially we had focused most of our
attention on language – its function in constructing realities, and the forms of
life that it supported. However, this investment opened up two further paths.
The first was an expanded appreciation of discourse as pragmatic action.
Both of us had abandoned the conception of language as an external expression
of an internal mind. Indeed, it is partly this realisation that has invited poststructuralists in general to replace the word ‘language’ with ‘discourse’.
However, by viewing discourse as pragmatic action, there was no principled
reason to distinguish between spoken and written language and other forms
of human activity (e.g. listening, walking, dancing). The second impetus
towards action was derived from Wittgenstein’s nestling language within
broader forms of life. Adding to the emphasis on discourse as action was
thus a concern with the broader institutions to which our relational actions
contributed. Neither of us was so much invested in carrying out research on
existing institutions; the outcomes would be cultural constructions in any
case. The challenge, then, was not to ‘get it right’ about the present so much
as to engage in practical efforts at social change.
Of course, the Taos Institute had long been dedicated to bringing
constructionist ideas together with professional practices. And, to be sure,
most of our related contributions had been heavily conceptual. However,
in these recent years the centre of gravity has shifted increasingly towards
practice. For me this meant that over half of my 2009 book, Relational
Being: Beyond Self and Community, illuminated what I viewed as illustrative
practices. For Shotter, the shift is earmarked in the Preface to his 2008
revision of Conversational Realities, he writes:
Now that I have ‘retired’ from academic life, and turned at last to working
with more practitioners, with people who have to face new and unique
circumstances every day . . . I find myself better able to appreciate their
needs more clearly. As a consequence I feel that much more needs to be
said. General claims are not enough. Practice is not a matter of applying
theories! . . . Central to the new, more practical approach to social
constructionism . . . is a focus on the spontaneous, expressive-responsivity
of growing and living forms.
(pp. ii–vi)
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Then, in the Prologue of his 2010 volume, Social Construction on the Edge,
he opens with, ‘This is a book for practitioners’ (p. v). This same concern is
also represented in Shotter’s close working relationship with therapists such
as Harlene Anderson, Tom Andersen and Jim Wilson, as well as his wife,
Cherrie Ravello. As well, it is represented in his consulting work with Patricia
Shaw and Theodore Taptiklis. All this is nothing to say about his numerous
contributions to conferences and workshops in therapy, organisational change
and dialogic practices. For me, however, it is the practice of our relationship
in which John has most visibly excelled. John has been a true comrade for all
seasons, inspiring, informing, challenging and most significantly honouring
in depth the relational process of which we are a part.

Notes
1 www.worldsharebooks.net.
2 Available as an open source publication at www.worldsharebooks.net.
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